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Abstract: Insights into the nondual relationship of organism and environment and their processual
nature have resulted in numerous efforts at understanding human behavior and motivation from a
holistic and contextual perspective. Meadian social theory, cultural historical activity theory (CHAT),
ecological psychology, and some interpretations of complexity theory persist in relating human activity
to the wider and more scientifically valid view that a process metaphysics suggests. I would like to
articulate a concept from ecological psychology – that of the affordance, and relate it to aspects of
phenomenology and neuroscience such that interpretations of the self, cognition, and the brain are
understood as similar to interpretations of molar behaviors exhibited in social processes. Experience
with meditation as a method of joining normal reflective consciousness with ‘awareness’ is described
and suggested as a useful tool in coming to better understand the nondual nature of the body.
Keywords: The Self, Ecological Psychology, Non-dual Models of the Self, Organism/Environment
Relations
EXPERIENTIAL INSIGHTSAND scientific discoveries into the nondual relationshipof organism and environment1 and the assumed processual nature of that relationshiphave resulted in numerous interpretations of human behavior, experience, and thought
from both convergent ‘objectivist’ perspectives and from more explicitly interpretive
contextual perspectives. For example, modern physical theories (e.g., Quantum Physics),
phenomenology, Meadian social theory, cultural historical activity theory (CHAT), ecolo-
gical psychology, some interpretations of complexity theory, and numerous traditions from
eastern, western, and indigenous perspectives persist in relating human behavior or activity
and experience to the wider view that a process metaphysics suggests.
Taking this view or interpretation of experience, thought, and activity seriously has im-
plications for personal, organizational, and global situations and events. The practical and
ideological separations and divisions resulting from disciplinary specializations around the
definitions and understanding of, for example, the self, relationships, communities, cultures,
or ideologies have a cumulative result that is evident in social, ecological, and political crisis
on a global scale. Specialization and the segregation of knowledge from practice in univer-
sities, laboratories, factories, and workshops (their benefits aside) continue to reinforce the
dominant lessons of the 17th century regarding matter, motion, time, and their relationship
to mind or consciousness. The above referenced process based insights into the apparent
1 Using either the word ‘organism’ or ‘environment’ without qualification results in a default interpretation that
continues to support a dualistic framework of “subject before an object in space” (see Rosen, 2004). Throughout
the present work these terms are understood through Dewey & Bentley’s (1949) transactional view that holds they
cannot be understood as separate but as moments in a relationship.
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nondual nature of the cosmos are, in my view, among the most significant ideas and theories
that human beings have yet developed.
The persistent difficulty in the spread and utilization of these ideas in human practices is,
it is argued here, rooted as much in the structure and nature of reflective human awareness,
or what is defined here as human consciousness, as it is in the processes of socialization,
marginalization, and historical framing. Language itself – not primarily as a system of signs
or of denotative and connotative meanings or communications, but as an effect on the under-
lying processes and functions of the whole human organism by its nature divides human
awareness into a binary and potentially alienated stance toward the larger wholeness of ex-
perience. Drawing on Mead’s work, and interpreting the creation of the reflective self as
consequence of the evolutionary processes resulting in the significant symbol, the claim that
the ‘nature’ of language creates a unique type of perspective2 resulting in the dualism inherent
in subject/object relations is plausible.
The purpose of this paper is to establish a relevant, practical, and accessible bridge between
the literature and theorizing of the nondual and dual using the general theoretical framework
offered by George Herbert Mead. Mead’s work is here related to literatures encompassing
developmental theory, religious experience, and social theory. This paper explores claims
about the separation of the dual and nondual with an effort toward understanding how to
mitigate the divisive - often negative, and conditioned or habitual consequences of this
phenomena so as to incorporate into the ordinariness of daily life the integrative and emergent
skills and lessons of nondual experience.
What is the Nondual?
The primary concept upon which this paper turns is the Meadian notion of the social self
(Mead, 1934; 1932/2002; 1938) and its necessary bifurcation of experience into the percep-
tual and conceptual world – a world of subjects and objects; a world with space independent
from time and time from space. In his extended discourse on space, time, and social experience
Mead (1932/2002) noted that “…in the perceptual world space and time are necessarily
separate. Space-time3 cannot be the form of perceptual experience” (p. 156). His argument
is essentially that the emergence/creation4 of the ‘self’ through the evolution of the human
organism and of language necessitated the breaking up of experience into the contact exper-
ience5 of immediate haptic/sensory involvement and the abstracted and languaged perceptu-
2 Perspective is a specifically Meadian (and Whiteheadian) term that is used here to illustrate the variety of perception
types and awareness types that are possible in the organic world. One can have, it is argued, a nondual perspective.
However, this concept, like the ‘one-sided boundary’ of Goudsmit (1992) does not admit to the reflective observer.
So, for example, I may be allowed to talk about the perspective of a ‘worm’ but can in no way project my perspective
on its perspective.
3 Note that the words space-time with a hyphen refer to the Einsteinian notion of spacetime. When space and time
are separated with the conjunction ‘and’ it refers to the ordinary experience of objects in a space before a subject
(Rosen, 2004. p. 21)
4 The difficulty in talking about Mead’s work is nowhere more apparent than when talking about ‘objects’ as sub-
stantial entities. For Mead the object is created by reflective human experience or consciousness. What is ‘actually’
happening is thought to be a continual emergence of patterned forms with varying degrees of stability or duration.
For Mead the ‘self’ is both a body or person and a psychological phenomena – and both are continuously emergent.
5 It would be more accurate from my perspective to say ‘contact awareness’ as I interpret the word experience to
suggest the conceptual involvement of reflective consciousness. However, Mead used this term so I will use it
throughout.
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al/visual experience of what he termed ‘distance experience’. My interpretation of Mead
suggests that this is the condition of human experience – that we simultaneously inhabit
space-time (with our bodies) and space independent of time (with our reflective conscious-
ness). Mead’s (1938) articulation of the processes underlying consciousness and identity
clearly link the contact6 experience of the organism (all organisms) with the distance exper-
ience presented through language but probably developed along the entire line of evolution.
The threshold between the contact experience of the person as organism and the distance
experience of the person as social being is the context for this paper. Mead’s work on the
theory of emergence7 stands as one of the earliest post-Darwin efforts to create a coherent
philosophical foundation for this phenomena (Mead & Reck, 1981, pp. xiii-lxii). Certainly
modern psychologists are interested in and study this phenomena of perception and attention
at the interface of experience and conscious awareness (McCormick, 1997).
Ideas of the nondual/dual distinction are grounded in physical/biological science, philo-
sophy, and the social sciences. From a physical perspective the work of Einstein and Bohr,
and more recently Barad (2007) and Robert Rosen (2000) stand as exemplars in the realization
that the idea and experience of dualism is insufficient. Whitehead (1938, pp. 127-147) artic-
ulated the need for a renewal of both science and social thought to match the insights that
physical scientists developed in their inquiry into the nature and origins of ‘matter’. Steven
Rosen’s (2004) extended treatise on the topic of the alienation of human reflective conscious-
ness from Apeiron or the primordial and continually emergent cosmic flux chronicles the
rise of science and human reflective consciousness. Dewey and Bentley (1949) demonstrated
the essentially nondual nature of organism/environment relations or transactions. This
philosophical ground on nondual nature of existence and the possibility of dissolving the
divide has been tilled through process metaphysics (Rescher, 1996; Whitehead, 1978),
philosophies of embodiment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991)
and spiritually oriented treatises (Buber, 1970; Muller-Ortega, 1989). Psychology has been
enriched in this area by the work of Piaget, (1971) and Vygotsky (1978;1986), and especially
through work in ecological psychology (Heft, 2001; Reed, 1996).
Given that, from Mead’s perspective, the experience8 of the nondual is, if not impossible,
then very difficult to conceive we are left with few choices. We can abandon the project of
penetrating this mystery, we can approach it through an experiential and/or metaphysical
perspectives, or we can try to understand it from a scientific point of view. This paper will
take the latter two approaches. First, I will engage in a brief discussion of the scientific point
of view using ideas of the nondual based in physics and biology and second, discuss tech-
6 See especially Mead’s Philosophy of the Act (1938) for an extended discussion of the relationship between contact
experience, distance experience, and the phenomenology of the self.
7 Emergence is an extremely problematic concept interpreted from a variety of angles. The most common positivist
interpretation is that complex systems express emergent processes resulting in state or phase changes that produce
qualitatively different phenomena (e.g., water emerges from the interaction of hydrogen and oxygen). This is also
the familiar ‘the whole is greater than the sum of the parts’ conversation. Emergence as used here is my interpretation
of both Mead and Whitehead that gets to its continuous processual qualities that would have everything always in
a process of emergent flux. Time, perspective, and substance are all evolved qualities that feedback on emergence
and more or less serve to stabilize the process for the particular organism resulting in a continuous prehensive sense
of ‘being’.
8 The term ‘experience’ is, of course, problematic. In this paper it refers to the felt and/or realized activity of a
person with reflective consciousness. As mentioned above Mead (and others) tend to conflate it with the notions
of both awareness and reflective consciousness.
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niques or practices that may shed some light on the metaphysical experience of this phenom-
ena. The ultimate trajectory of this argument is toward the view of the continuous emergence
and adaptation of the self/environment process as a simultaneous physical and psychological
experience.
It is also important to note the phenomenological tradition has also supported this type of
inquiry although Crotty (1998. pp. 78-86) argues that it has itself (at least in North America)
retreated to a formal objectivist view of reality privileging the solitary thinking organism
(person) to be the sole interpreter of the unproblematic object. If interpreted in the light of
European phenomenology (Dreyfus, 1991: Merleau-Ponty, 1962) and taken as a serious
practice of trying to penetrate the depths of the nondual absent language (reflective conscious-
ness) then I see no fundamental inconsistency with those ideas and much of the thesis argued
here.
Physics & Biology
The postmodern tendency to label science as objectivist, positivist, and reductive certainly
has merit given the track record of scientific endeavor in the last three hundred years. This
is particularly true of organized ‘corporate’ science that is practiced to achieve pragmatic,
economic, and/or utilitarian ends. The market seizes scientific insights and discoveries and
transforms them into commodities which in turn reinforce the unproblematic concretization
of subject/object relations. However, another kind of science is also practiced. This interdis-
ciplinary science recognizes the complex, emergent, and relational nature of phenomena and
has developed both biological and physical theories9 to accommodate the empirical experi-
ence/observation of phenomena (Jarvilehto, 2009; 1998a; 1998b).
The biophysicist Robert Rosen (2000), for example, writes about the fundamental non-
compressibility or non-reduction of biological entities into rational algorithms or models.
He observes that mathematical and structural linguistic efforts to capture the complexity of
life are doomed to failure.
A system is called complex if it has a nonsimulable model. The science of such complex
systems is very different from the science we have become used to over the past three
centuries. Above all, complex systems cannot be completely characterized in terms of
any reductionistic scheme based on simple systems. (p. 306)
Rosen’s critique of both mimesis and reductionism as explanatory causal factors of phenomena
invalidate claims of ultimate legitimacy and primacy made from the perspective of the post-
positivist and traditional scientific perspective. His work also suggests that understanding
the self as a complex system would inevitably involve a reworking of our communicative
practices.
Maturana (1978) and Maturana and Varela (1980; 1987) developed autopoiesis as a
method and framework for describing and explaining the emergence and stability of life
from a perspective cognizant of the observer’s crucial role in making meaning and as
Maturana (1978) observes “we literally create the world in which we live by living it (p.
9 I will not be talking about social science theories here as that is the object of the argument. It is precisely the
problematic nature of language and social experience that occludes some of our thinking about what may be the
likely substrate of our emergent forms.
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61).” Their work serves to integrate physical biological theory with the epistemological
problems related to observers and observations and problematizes our interpretations of any
biological system as expressing perceptual or intentional behaviors. There is an obvious in-
tersection of autopoiesis and the work of Dewey and Bentley in their efforts to clarify the
epistemological conundrums of subjects and objects in the context of nondual emergent
phenomena (Mousavi & Garrison, 2003).
Karen Barad (2007; 2008) is a theoretical particle physicist and feminist scholar who has
developed the philosophy of Neils Bohr into a posthumanist account of the two moments of
‘matter’ and ‘meaning’ as reflective of an entangled wholeness in a state of continuous
emergence. Her notion of ‘agential realism’ captures the paradox of the observer and the
observed by means of the argument that relationship precedes relata (Barad, 2008) and that
we as individuals/organisms are in a flux of continuous emergence that is fundamentally
nondual. Similar to Cooper’s (2005) analysis of relationships between individuals (relata)
emerging out of latent structure in a complex background of process (not substance) our
consciousness of objects is itself the measure of our alienation from the whole.
From a physical and traditional perspective what is most astonishing are the ubiquitous
patterns of binary relationships that undergird scientific description. From the dual nature
of matter and energy, to sexual differentiation and dimorphism, to information theory, we
see oscillation between antimonies at every level of scale. In each case it appears that one
pole of the relationship calls out or signals to the other pole to, at the very least, create a
movement. The cascade of these movements eventually appear to result in the complex
phenomena of organisms and human behavior. A radically different but coherent theoretical
and empirical investigation into these biological and psychological phenomena has been
occurring in the area of ecological psychology for a number of years. This is an important
movement in that the bulk of our social science theorizing is built upon assumptions drawn
from a psychology that is fundamentally representationalist and reinforces and subtly preju-
dices thought and language from recognizing the transactional and nondual relationships
direct experience suggests.
Ecological Psychology & the Affordance
Work in the area of ecological psychology (Good, 2006; Heft, 2001; Ingold, 1996; Reed,
1996a; Reed 1996b) takes a closer look at perception/environment relations based on a the-
oretical framework mostly articulated by Gibson (1966; 1979) and Barker (1968). In this
work perception is an active exploratory function utilizing distal information in a continuous
organism/environment involvement mediated by transactional mediums, surfaces, and sub-
stances (Gibson, 1979). From Barker’s (1968) and Reed’s (1996) perspective the behavioral
and conceptual consequences of these processes (reflective consciousness) is the mediation
occurring in social or ‘behavior’ settings. The theorized element/process of this mediation
of individual-to-setting or individual-to-individual or even setting-to-setting10 is the afford-
ance.
10 The notion of setting to setting mediation is problematic but can be made sense of using post-humanist accounts
offered by, for example, Barad 2007, 2008 from a physical perspective and Latour, 1996 from a social perspective.
The general notion here is that the elements or the relata ‘fit’ in a seamless and mutually instantiating manner. For
example, a fallen tree in the woods ‘fits’ the ground (and the ground ‘fits’ the fallen tree) as a site for the mutual
interaction/transaction of the biome/organism process of transformation.
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A central and much argued about idea in ecological psychology is that of the affordance
(Jones, 2003). The affordance is a hybrid concept 11combining the physical world with the
world of molar human behavior. Heft (2001) describes Gibson’s description of the affordance
as having “…perceiver-specific qualities and also is a property of the environment. From
the point of view of the objective-subjective dichotomy, such a property is incomprehensible
(p. 125).” Stoffregen (2003) defines affordances as “properties of events in the animal-envir-
onment system” (p. 35). What emerges from the organism-environment transaction (see
Altman & Rogoff, 1987) are properties that exist only as a function of that transaction. For
example, the smoothness of water required for a bird to slow its motion for controlled landing
is not necessarily ‘smooth’ to the gnat or fly. This property which ‘affords landing’ is
emergent, contextual, and perspectival. Initially the affordance can been seen as a persistence
in the organism’s environment that serves to regulate its behavior. It can also be understood
as an ‘opportunity for action’. Affordances as properties can become significantly embodied
in artifacts. For example, a chair affords sitting in a much more accommodating way than a
lamp post. In the same way a restaurant affords multiple actions associated with eating and
visiting. Culture, language, and history collaborate to create a landscape of affordances that
take up most of our time and attention. We become engaged/entangled in our world via the
inescapable necessities of our afforded environment. Baron (2010, pp. 250-255) usefully
distinguishes between social and non-social affordances to help interpret and translate per-
sonality and other common dispositional characterizations about people into this non-tradi-
tional psychological frame.
From a Meadian perspective I interpret the affordance as both the source of contact exper-
ience and the link to distance experience. Contact experience as I understand it is the organ-
ism’s pre-reflective-consciousness experience of the sensory world. We share the ecological
environment of contact experience with all organisms. What language has brought us (ac-
cording to Mead) is the opening up of the temporal and spatial landscape into ‘distance ex-
perience’ that hold space and time as independent parameters that facilitate subject/object
distinctions as well as relations. Our perceptions and conceptions of ‘space’ are extrapolations
from our bodies’ contact with the immediate physical and sensory environment – “The round
solid coin in the hand is the ultimate fact of every oval of vision (Mead, 1938, p. 281)12.
Even so our perceptions are not necessarily fair brokers of our landscapes affordances.
For example, what I may initially think about as near may turn out to be far (a function
of distance experience or reflective consciousness). If I consider my hand resting on a table
and feel the pressure of the table on my hand I am experiencing/considering the feeling of
pressure (contact experience) and the consideration of my hand, arm, body, and the table,
room, and space that surrounds me (distance experience). I continue to oscillate between the
two modes until eventually I conceptualize the whole experience and it becomes one of re-
flective consciousness. The contact experience of what is ‘near’ (the pressure) is made distant
or ‘far’ (the body, arm, table system) and the distant or ‘far’ is made ‘near’ through my ac-
tion/decision to mitigate what I consider to be too much pressure, boredom with the experi-
11 This is a hybrid in the sense it serves as both noun/verb simultaneously. It is a process/object kind of idea. The
affordance is both a ‘thing’ and a ‘happening’.
12 From Mead’s perspective the significant symbol gives rise to the self, distance experience, and the object in a
continuous emergent expression. The argument supporting this claim and the background developed to make this
argument make up what I understand as the major body of Mead’s work. Obviously that entire argument cannot
be recapitulated here.
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ment, or whatever other thought may encourage me to abandon the arm position under con-
sideration. What is far can be understood as near13 as the distance experience of reflective
consciousness is collapsed into the contact experience of the body. Under this reading the
behavior of any organism can be understood as melded or continuously fused to the medium,
surfaces, and substances of contact experience. The ‘world’ become a continuous and non-
dual medium of events in a process of continual emergence. The organism as such is a con-
tingent fluid movement/event in the fluid movement/event of spacetime.
This only makes sense if one interprets the Meadian argument of the ‘object’ as an artifact
of reflective consciousness – that is, language. Gibson’s ‘optic array’ captures this thinking
in his articulation of the organism’s adapted navigational behaviors in a continuously unfold-
ing awareness14 of ambient environmental information that only comes to ‘exist’ as such as
the organism actively moves through the environment. We are in continuous contact with
an ever fluctuating ecology occurring as a function of our activity. What our reflective con-
sciousness perceives as distant are actually symbols or concepts standing in for the proximal
interface of the affordance which is continuously enacted by our activity. What we consider
as ‘real’ in all this are the artifacts of Mead’s distance experience conceptualized as objects.
These ‘objects’ include symbols, signals, marks on paper, and all other ‘detectors’ that humans
have devised to talk about and think about the apparently proximal interface between stimulus
in the ambient environment and structures at the surface of the organism. One might say that
an empirical realist claim about the ontology of the object only becomes clear (or valid)
when we are actually in contact with it.
It follows then that empiricism has been the effort to map the conceptual world of distance
experience to the apparent ‘realness’ of contact experience. Science as commonly practiced
has been a systematic attempt to forge these relationships. This project fell apart from an
epistemological perspective in the latter part of the 19th century when it became apparent
that our experience of embodiment in the world was significantly rooted in reflective con-
sciousness and the apparent or phenomenal separation of the subject from the object (or the
self from the other) is actually a fiction. There is no ‘out there’ or ‘in here’ in space-time.
It’s all one ‘thing’ that is actually not a ‘thing’ but a process. What our science has unequi-
vocally and progressively revealed is a seamless emergence - with organisms in continuous
contact with the mediums, surfaces, and substances of the ecological array. Symbolic inter-
actionism, existentialism, phenomenology, and the birth of interpretive embodied methodo-
logies have developed to keep up with the findings of science that suggest a nondual
wholeness out of which we, along with everything else, are continuously emerging. Certainly
what remains problematic in this articulation is the problem of the self and consciousness
and how and/or why we come to grips with this apparent alienation and transcend or reconcile
the bifurcation that reflective consciousness suggests.
13 Of course a major problem with the language of ‘near and far’ is that it assumes an ontological certainty of space
as distance experience reveals it. Much of Mead’s work is bent on showing how these concepts are relative to lan-
guage and human consciousness and have no place in what he seems to think is the more primary world of relativity
and spacetime.
14 Awareness is also a problematic word. Here it is used to express the proprioceptive or prehensive feedback
mechanisms that translate sensory stimulus throughout a biological system in a more or less regular or predictable
way - for example the effects of ‘cold’ on a warm blooded mammal.
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Boundaries, Identity, & the Self
Embodiment Perspectives
Support for Mead’s basic premise of the social construction of the self is found in Vygotsky’s
(1978; 1986) and Leont’ev’s (1978) work which underpins much of cultural historical
activity theory (CHAT). While this stream of theorizing appears more concerned with
activity and social interactions than with epistemological questions of the self, it nonetheless
illuminates the dynamic and interactive coherence arising within the biological and cultural
phenomena we study. Vygotsky (1986) offers a credible empirical account of the relationship
between language and the emerging social identity and underscores the central role of lan-
guage in human development. From Mead’s perspective the development of the ‘self’ is also
rooted in biological, evolutionary, and ethological interpretations of phenomena.
According to Mead, organisms entrain themselves to conspecifics through a conversation
of gesture and response. The significant gestures (Mead’s term) that organisms employ are
happening on an evolutionary ladder of increasing coordination via communication amongst
entrained interlocutors that eventually, and through the pressures of increased social com-
plexity and evolved neurobiological structures, result in a ‘phase shift’ in communications
(see Latour, 1996). This conversation of gestures, according to Mead, results in homo sapiens
internalizing15 via the significant symbol first specific others (family) and then through a
progressive process of role taking and role playing eventually come to the generalized other
(Franks, 1985; Mead, 1934, 1938) and the creation of the reflective self. This internalized
generalized other becomes the ‘me’ of reflective consciousness and is the beginning of the
deep patterning that we come to know as our subjective selves. As a dynamic process and
using the same functions of the central nervous system that afforded us the ability to develop
increasingly complex gestures and responses suggestive of the ‘me’ we also find the “I”.
Mead asserts that their combination results in reflective consciousness: “The “I” reacts to
the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of others. Through taking those atti-
tudes we have introduced the “me” and we react to it as an “I” (1934, p. 174)”. Mead goes
on to suggest that the “I” is elusive and can never really be grasped because when we land
on it we can only do so via memory and it is then firmly lodged in the “me”. In other words,
the self takes on the attitude of the “I” in the form of the “me” just like it does the attitude
of the other. While Mead suggests that substantive questions about the “I/me” relationship
are metaphysical (Mead, 1934, pp. 173-178) it is clear that the sentient, aware, biologically
and neurologically connected nature of organisms contains a locus or center of activity that
is clearly not symbolically or linguistically self-reflective in the manner human beings are.
Griffin (1989) following Whitehead’s description of prehension as the phenomena of non-
sensory perception explaining the enduring nature of structure in spacetime says,
This prehension is the receptivity…with which every occasion of experience begins.
Panexperientialism implies that every actual entity enjoys perception in the sense of
this nonsensory prehension. Sensory organs are not necessary, in other words, to per-
15 The ‘internalization of the generalized other’ may seem like a kind of ‘hand waving’ move in Mead’s theory if
not understood through its neurobiological and evolutionary roots. Emerging theory and science on mirror neurons
and the phenomena of synchrony and phased oscillators provide empirical evidence that this hypothesis of the
creation of the significant symbol and the self has some objectivist scientific support.
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ceive, in the sense of prehend. It is therefore not absurd to attribute a type of perception
to things such as cells, and even molecules, and electrons. They can perceive their en-
vironment, in the sense of “internally take account” of it. This position also implies,
that, even in organisms with sensory organs, such as ourselves, sensory perception is
a secondary, not the primary, form of perception. (p. 25 italics in the original)
Reed (1996, pp. 20-28) makes a very similar argument in recounting important but mostly
forgotten empirical work by Charles Darwin demonstrating the awareness and apparently
purposeful behavior of earthworms as they navigate and adapt to varying types of soil. It is
in phenomena of this sort that I locate the “I” and count it as that which theoretically connects
us to all life independent of human categories, identities, and words. Consequently we are
all prehensively aware and this awareness sits behind language and continually advances
both the self and language as the primary motive force of the organism.
The I/Me phenomenon of the reflective self locates our experience in what Mead called
the ‘specious present’ or the peculiar juxtaposition of the past and future in the present to
create a sense of continuous being. Mead (1932/2002) says: “We find here the fundamental
relation between the future and the past in the present. The distance experience is the promise
of contact experience (p. 65).” This phenomenological ‘present’ is, according to Mead, an
artifact of reflective consciousness. To be aware of the specious present as a human being
appears not to be synonymous with experiencing the present as an organism without reflective
consciousness (Kentridge, Nijboer, & Heywood, 2008; McCormick, 1997) or even as tested
by an observer tracking a subject’s conscious response to an applied stimulus. This illustrates
the importance of making a categorical distinction between awareness and the experience
of the self as a function of reflective consciousness
Stacey and others (Stacey, Griffin, & Shaw, 2000; Stacey, 2001; 2003) following Mead
and utilizing the process sociology of Elias (1991) argue in a compelling set of books for an
interpretation of Mead that locates the Meadian ‘self’ in a dynamic emergent process that
comprises the ‘living present’ (Mead’s ‘specious present) whereby reflective consciousness
creates the symbolic world of spatial and temporal independence and thereby stabilizes the
appearance of enduring subjects before static and/or dynamic objects (artifacts of reflective
consciousness) in a timeless space regulated or metered by a spaceless time. Further, that
the patterns continually enacted by self-reflective consciousness operate out of gesture/re-
sponse dynamics and emerge as inclusive boundaries to selves, groups, and societies which
in turn instantiate exclusive power relations. These power relations are a concomitant of the
boundary creation and are necessary for reflective consciousness to sustain its identity over
against the identity of its objects. This of course suggests Foucault’s (1994) and other’s in-
terpretations of how discourse structures social life.
Objective Perspectives
More or less traditional social psychology approaches in exploring the relationship between
the subjective experience of individuals and the macro behaviors and processes of organiza-
tions and groups are found in personal identity, social identity, and social categorization
theory (Postmes & Jetten, 2006). On the other hand, positioning theory (Harré & Moghaddam,
2003) is an effort to encompass the complexity of dynamic human behavior in groups that
is sensitive to local, cultural, and idiosyncratic phenomena. This work is methodologically
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satisfying in exploring self and group relationships but does not appear to directly discuss
the phenomenology and origins of the self in detail.
The psychology and neuroscience of attachment (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Siegel
1999) does attempt to reason from the singular biological case and explore the neurobiolo-
gical consequences of relational bonding . Securely attached infants and toddlers are thought
to be better ‘socialized’ than the non-securely attached in their approach to the “strange
situation” (Siegel 1999, pp. 67-120) involving unknown but social others. Secure attachment
is also thought to be implicated in a host of other body states involving emotion, metabolism,
and general physiological functions as they relate to social experience. There is some evidence
that a lack of relational bonding results in altered brain physiology and function (Siegel,
1999, pp. 317-320).
In both of these objectivist traditions the effort is toward understanding and, to some extent,
operationalizing the relationship so as to develop stable units of analysis for empirical work.
This research is typically achieved through a perspective that holds the observer as non-
problematic and generally is ‘about’ people or things as objects and not taking into account
a direct experience of people or things intersubjectively. A bridge between the objectivist
approaches mentioned above and the embodied and/or non-objectivist traditions can be found
in current work on the neuroscience of meditation practice and its linkages to attachment
and relationship (Hölzel, et. al., 2008; Kozasa, et al., 2008; Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007;
Siegel, 2007). To achieve this latter perspective we need to further shift our methods and
begin to explore the 1st person subjective techniques for penetrating consciousness and the
nature of experience and awareness.
Metaphysics and the Nondual
Organizational theorist Chris Argyris (1999) is partly famous for observing that espoused
theories and theories in use are often worlds apart. The perennial problem of consistency,
integrity, ‘walking one’s talk’ and generally acting or doing what we want and intend to do
is of central concern to theorists in my field of leadership studies. What this paper offers is
a theoretical framework and warrant for including in theoretical investigation the work of a
‘practice’ or of paying attention to one’s own consciousness, behavior, and experience in a
very direct way. Obviously there are many diverse means to this end. One means discussed
here and linked to the literature above is the practice of meditation. One type of meditation,
Vipassana, will be discussed but is by no means the foremost or ideal of reflective or self-
awareness practices.
Buddhist psychology (Kornfield, 2008) is the term for a growing field of studies that
combines classical Buddhist teaching and practice with western conceptions of the self, the
mind, and the experience of being human. It has become part of what are known as ‘mind-
fulness practices’ (Wallace & Shapiro, 2006) and is used therapeutically and is also researched
in psychology and neuroscience contexts (Epstein, 1995; Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007).
Fundamental to the practice of mindfulness is the intentional altering of brain states to, for
example, reduce stress and anxiety or otherwise change a person’s qualitative experience of
being alive.
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Suffering and the Pathologies of the Dual
The Buddhist interpretation (Bodhi, 2005) of the above mentioned brain states and the
reason for ‘altering’ them is rooted in the fundamental theoretical framework of the ‘illusory
self’ or that invented and concretized world of objects and their relationships. This reading
is consistent with Mead’s analysis though his lacks the normative and prescriptive injunctions
of Buddhist philosophy. In Buddhism it is thought that with increased practice of meditation
this illusory self will disappear and along with it the suffering that its attachment to both itself
and its objects generates. In Buddhist terms this suffering is the result of believing that the
artifacts of reflective consciousness (i.e., its conceptions and perceptions) are mistakenly
attributed to be ‘real’ in the face of the continual change and transformation of the underlying
nondual ‘reality’. Our attachment to the ‘appointed’ permanence of ‘things’ is doomed to
“disappointment” (Trungpa, 1976/1988, pp. 5-7).
From a Meadian perspective things look much the same. The disjunction between the
socially constructed world of reflective consciousness and the continual emergence of contact
experience creates a dissonance that manifests itself in a variety of ways. Implicit in what
is argued here is that the imbalances and dysfunctions of contemporary global cultures are
related to the patterns of behavior suggested either by Buddhist teachings around suffering
or the more secular argument based on Mead. Attachment, aversion, and delusion are thought
to be the inevitable consequence of the habitual and increasingly unaware processes under-
lying the human condition - the simple state of reflective human consciousness – knowledge
of the self and other.
Meditation Practice
Vipassana meditation in the Buddhist tradition illustrates key principles explored in this
paper. Of particular interest is the practice of ‘noble silence’. This practice occurs in a medi-
ation retreat setting where both speech and gaze are withheld (the ‘noble silence’16) for
varying numbers of days while numerous individuals abide in close proximity engaging in
cycles of sitting meditation. The dynamic that results in terms of subjective experience and
ideation appear to substantiate in a direct way the fact of the “internalized generalized other”
offered by Mead and its relationship to contact and distance experience. This also illustrates
the role of the ‘affordance’ in playing a role of habitually reinforcing expectations and beha-
vior in a social environment.
It has been my experience17 that the intentional withholding of verbal and visual stimulus
begins a process of unintentional ideation around the nature of others and the meaning of
their nature in reference to my own immediate experience. I have experienced over the course
of 6 years several mediation retreats from 4 to 10 days duration. In all of these retreats I ex-
perienced numerous and elaborate projections and fantasies composed of a variety of thoughts
and ideas that often seemed wholly inconsistent with what I believe and who I think I am.
16 This interpretation and characterization of ‘noble silence’ was what I learned from a Zen Buddhist teacher in
one of my first mediation retreats. I should also note that at this very first retreat I decided to take this injunction
very seriously and apply the ‘noble silence’ rigorously. I since came to find that not everyone took the teacher’s
advice so seriously. The term is used somewhat differently in the literature on Buddhism to describe the aspects of
‘right speech’ and refraining of speaking of things best not (or unable to be) said.
17 This paper is not a thorough study of my (or anyone’s) experience of meditation or dialogue per se. The vignettes
offered here are for illustrative purposes only.
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I invented and spontaneously created stories, reasons, and social realities in the absence of
any direct visual or aural/linguistic stimulus. Over time the meditation (especially in the 10
day retreats) settled these often chaotic projections down. My understanding of this phenom-
ena is that the habitual self is maintained by frequent social interactions that are particularly
stimulated by conversation and visual facial stimulus of others both of which are part and
parcel of the gesture/response dynamic. We create habitual and reflex type associations that
manifest themselves as thoughts (Bohm, 1992, pp. 118-120). Social categorization theory
and social identity theory (Postmes & Jetten, 2006) both articulate the dynamics of maintain-
ing a sense of identity in groups and suggest that our subjective sense of self is dependent
on these social norms and are cued and instantiated through social interaction.
My experience is that both verbal and visual cues (e.g., me explicitly or implicitly telling
people who I am and me seeing them seeing me) help stabilize my familiar sense of self
through the multiple gestures and responses of daily life. When we intentionally interrupt
these ‘natural’ processes we become aware of the ‘other’ in the self in the form of projections
and specific fantasies about the other absent any concrete information. For example, in most
cases the retreat begins without participants getting to know one another or even in some
cases really get a good look at the face of another. Once the retreat begins and the ‘noble
silence’ is enacted you don’t see the face or interact with the other except as a fellow body
in the process of walking to the dining hall, your room, or the meditation hall. And yet I
found myself creating images, stories, and/or ‘identities’ of these others that were quite
elaborate and full of affect and meaning to me. I also realized that I was doing this absent
any real information or knowledge of the other. This was and is a profoundly affecting ex-
perience that can only be reasonably explained (in my opinion) using a theory of the self as
outlined here by Mead. For me the meditation experience has, over time, revealed habitual
patterns of ideation and ways of interacting with others. There is some indication that this
awareness of habitual patterns can be substantiated empirically with brain-imaging techniques
showing how the structure of neurons in the prefrontal cortex (structures associated with
ideation around habitual or repetitive behaviors) are altered through meditation (Siegel,
2007, pp. 355-358). Self reports indicate a subjective state of enhanced receptivity and
awareness around the triggering behaviors and observers report subjects as more present
and exhibiting a ‘kinder’ affect (Siegel, 2007, pp. 31-32; pp. 337-362).
What is encountered as a result of this disengagement from unconscious/unaware social
engagement is, of course, the focus of Buddhist (and other) practices and is often conceived
of as the beginnings of an experience of the nondual. In the context of this paper it is the
‘experience’ of non-reflective consciousness, or as I have defined it, awareness. What these
reflections suggest is that there are ‘practices’ that can be employed to probe the boundaries
of the nondual and the dual and that the ‘fruits’ of these practices may result in a progressively
greater awareness that has as a probable consequence the enlargement of the specious present.
This, I contend, can result in kinder, more thoughtful, respectful, and curious people insofar
as they are aware and mindful of their complex social roles.
Conclusion
The argument as laid out here suggests that there is an empirical scientific and phenomeno-
logical basis for better understanding the origins and effects of reflective consciousness on
experience and behavior and that that empirical scientific and phenomenological basis is
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confirmed and further explicated by an intentional “practice” (in this case Buddhist medita-
tion) . Both of these perspectives may be necessary to sufficiently understand and work with
the challenges that the ecological juxtaposition of embodiment and reflective consciousness
bring. Our compelling but apparently illusory belief in the ‘objective’ and solid nature of
the world has obviously been a mixed blessing. On the one hand it gives us the tools and
talents of communication, aesthetics, and technology. On the other hand it has harmed (and
continues to harm) our ecological and social environments. Our persistent belief in the
‘reality’ of the self and the other as distinct, separate, and often alienated beings appears to
damage the integrative forces of collaboration, community, and the development of loving
and caring personal and social relations (Noddings, 1984) .
The work of George Herbert Mead is a valuable and underutilized body of thought that
can serve to help articulate and demonstrate the nature of our reflective consciousness and
its relationship to the phenomenal world that is apparently continually emerging in a field
of space-time with quantum effects holding together the emergent patterns that we experience
as matter and meaning. Practices such as Vipassana meditation can also work to help indi-
viduals loosen the hold that sociality and reflective consciousness have on our cognitive and
affective states as active living beings in order to more gracefully and peacefully negotiate
the boundaries, power relations, and identities sociality implies. Awareness of these ideas
and practices may bring humans into a closer more continuous relationship with the ongoing
adaptation of the human organism with the ecological environment. Rather than consciousness
distancing us from our natural world, we may use it to forge more enduring links to root our
experience in sustainable and generative practices. The irony of the meditation experience
is that it (and many other forms of devotion, contemplative, or scholarly practice) may
temporarily remove its practitioners from sociality but serves, in the end, to make its practi-
tioners even more equipped and capable for meaningful and caring social interaction.
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